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Survival of many family farms is dependent on successful intergenerational transfer.  Given the 
importance of succession in the farm sector, the purpose of this paper is to examine factors that 
are likely to influence succession decisions on U.S. farms. The paper uses 2001 ARMS data and 
a multinomial Logit (MNL) regression to estimate family succession, non-family succession, and 
farm exit decisions of farm households in the U.S. Model choice and specification issues are 
discussed. Results indicate that operator’s education, household wealth, growth in farm size, and 
farm debt are important factors that determine succession decisions. Additionally, farm 
specialization is taken into consideration when farm operators make their succession plans.  
 
Keywords: farm households, intergenerational transfer, micro-analysis, qualitative choice  
 models,  successions   2
Succession in Family Farm Business: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Farm 
Sector 
 
Most farm households control a substantial amount of wealth. In 2001, U.S. farm households had 
average net worth of $545,869, compared with $395,500 for non-farm households (Mishra et 
al.). Failure to plan carefully for retirement and transfer of the estate can result in serious 
problems such as financial insecurity, personal and family dissatisfaction, and unanticipated 
capital losses. Intergenerational transfers can be classified by their timing, into the forms of 
transfers and bequests (Altig and Davis, 1992). They can also be classified by type, into the 
forms of physical capital and human capital (Nervlove et al., 1984). Physical capital can be 
further classified into liquid and illiquid assets. This last classification is particularly interesting 
when the relatively illiquid assets are indivisible and when they constitute a large fraction of 
family wealth. Examples of this type of asset are the productive assets owned by self-employed 
individuals or family businesses. In family farms, the farm itself constitutes a physical asset that 
is highly illiquid, indivisible to a large extent, and in most cases constitutes a large fraction if not 
all of family wealth.  
 
Many studies have shown that even when farming does not provide the family with an adequate 
standard of living, farmers refrain from selling farm assets and try to supplement their income 
from other sources, such as off-farm work (Mishra and Goodwin; Mishra and Sandretto; Mishra 
et al.) This tends to delay structural change within the sector (Kimhi and Nachlieli). The survival 
of many family farms is dependent on successful intergenerational transfer. Additionally, 
according to Pesquin et al. the family farm sector relies heavily on intergenerational succession. 
Gale (1993) points out that entry into farming by the ‘next generation’ holds a place of central   3
importance in the determination of industry structure and the total number of farmers and farm 
families.  
 
The family farm is more than a profit maximizing enterprise. It is an asset whose productive life 
expectancy may extend well beyond that of its operator, and whose future value may depend on 
its continuous functioning; it is a place of residence for the farmer in old age; and it is attached to 
land, whose symbolic importance exceeds its economic value in many societies. Gasson and 
Errington (1993) looked at the development cycle of the farm family and the growth and decay 
cycle of the farm business, and concluded that “synchronizing these two cycles may itself be 
crucial for the continuance of the family business (p. 226).” Business succession is one important 
link between these two cycles. Succession has been defined as the process concerned with the 
transfer of management, or control of the business (Hastings). While succession differs from 
inheritance (transfer of ownership) and retirement (life after active work), the three are inter-
linked (Hastings). The purpose of this paper is to examine factors that are likely to influence 
succession decisions on U.S. farms. Farm, operator, and successor characteristics that may 
contribute to a higher probability of succession will be identified. An understanding of the 
factors that influence succession is important as it allows insight into possible structural changes 
on the horizon for U.S. agriculture. Given that succession and retirement are inter-linked, 
examining succession planning activities of farm households may also provide a perspective 
about how households plan to use their business assets to generate income in later life. 
 
 
   4
Literature Review 
Succession planning is a component of a household’s risk management strategy for its farm 
business in as much as it is aimed at continuity of the businesses management team. Succession 
and estate planning have been described as being part of a complete business plan for 
agricultural producers (McCorkle and Bevers). A unique feature of the farm sector, in 
comparison to other sectors of the economy, is that a large share of farms, particularly large 
businesses, have traditionally passed within the family.  The study of farm succession has a long 
tradition in the Rural Sociology literature (Gasson and Errington, 1993; Blanc and Perrier-
Cornet, 1993; Carroll and Salamon, 1988; Coughenour and Kowlaski, 1977; Friedberger, 1983). 
However, agricultural economists have devoted little attention to this topic (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 
2001; Weiss 1999). Most economics literature on the topic of farm succession is confined to a 
discussion of how succession is affected by tax considerations (Boehlje and Eisgruber, 1972; 
Harl, 1989; Harlin, 1992; Tauer, 1985). In the early 1990s economic historians examined farm 
succession practices while investigating Irish emigration (Guinnane, 1992; Kennedy, 1991). 
 
The phenomenon of intrafamily succession is observed in many economies (Bryden et al. 1992). 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) argue that intrafamily succession enables the extended family to 
enjoy the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing when annuity markets are imperfect. Pesquin 
et al. (1999) mention additional advantages of intrafamily farm succession such as ‘smooth’ 
transition, reduction in transfer cost, and lower transfer taxes. Additionally, Tweeten and Zulauf 
(1994) point out that intra-family farm succession allows entering farmers to overcome 
borrowing constraints, at least in commercial farms. Using panel data of Austrian farms, Weiss 
(1999) found a strongly significant effect of intra-family succession on farm survival. Kimhi and   5
Nachlieli (2001) studied the likelihood of intra-family intergenerational succession on Israeli 
family farms. They found that age of the operator, level of schooling of the operator, and the age 
of the oldest child were significant factors in having an intra-family successor. Further, number 
of children and off-farm work did not have any impact on the probability of having an intra-
family successor. The authors also found that Israeli farms with more land have lower 
probability of intra-family succession.  
 
Some studies in the literature relate to farm succession and farm investment. For example, Potter 
and Lobley (1992) show that the investment behavior (on-farm investment) of farmers without 
successors was radically different from that of those where a successor has been identified. 
Perrier-Cornet et al. (1991) report that in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, farm 
modernization is associated with intergenerational succession. However, farms located in the 
United Kingdom, Greece, and Italy did not show any significant relationship. Kimhi et al. 
(1995), using panel data of Israeli farms, found that during the 1970s succession contributed 
tremendously to farm expansion (both in terms of farm size and intensity of production). 
However, due to a widespread farm financial crisis in the 1980s, the expansionary phase did not 
continue. On the contrary, the farm financial crisis forced many successors to seek off-farm 
employment. Phimister (1994) argues that financial pressures arising from intergenerational farm 
asset transfers may have a negative impact on subsequent farm investment.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Early studies described two motivations for transfer of assets and wealth; altruism and exchange 
(Cox). In an altruism framework, a benevolent individual (say parent) cares about the well-being   6
of other individuals (the children). In an exchange model (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers) the 
parent makes a transfer to the children in return for services received from them. Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers applied an exchange model to bequest behavior (transfer only takes place 
after the death of the donor). They found empirical support for the bequest-as-exchange model. 
However, a third strand of research (or third motive) in the 1980s treated family members as non 
altruistic; transfers represent payments made in exchange for services provided by family 
members. Non altruistic family behavior has been investigated in a variety of contexts, including 
annuity insurance (Kotlikoff and Spivak); household production (McElroy and Horney), 
insurance against shortfalls in income (Kaufman), and labor supply decisions (McElroy).  
 
Transfers of wealth in the case of traditional farm households comes closer to fitting the first and 
third motive that covers annuity income, household production and labor supply. For example, 
the parents (former farmers) transfer the wealth (farm) to the child, who continues to farm, with 
the expectation that children will provide them with a place for retirement and support their 
living expenses. Further, the parents are involved in mentoring the child by providing farming 
experience and a helping hand if necessary. In return the child provides support for parents in old 
age.  
 
Consider a representative farm household. Assume two individuals, the donor (say, the parent) 
and the recipient (the child)
1. The parent’s objective function is 
 
(1)            c k   c p p S C V S C U     U , ,     7
where  p U = parent’s well-being; V = child’s well-being;  j C = k p j   denote parent and child 
consumption, and  c S denotes support and services the child provides to the parent(s). Equation 
(1) is a classical case of both altruism and exchange. In this case the parent cares about the well-





and in turn the child provides services, such as a place for 
retirement, share of farm income, savings, and investments related to the farm business. The 
partials of other arguments in equation (1) are all positive. Having a successor also raises 
potential farm income, saves on estate taxes and creates additional money that can be divided 
between the parents and child or between two generations. This type of succession is mutually 
agreeable to both parties because it is in the best interest of both parties
2. The parent generation 
gets money from the farm business (assuming that the parent has a valid interest in the farm and 
makes it successful). Dealing with cross-sectional data, we assume that the parent has made a 
decision on whether to pass the farm to the next generation. The parent’s utility level is 
conditional on having a successor. Equation 1 is maximized and depends on the conditioning 
variables: those affecting farm income, other production, and household variables.  
 
Empirical Framework 
A multinomial logit (MNL) regression model is used in this paper to examine the determinants 
of farm succession and farm exit among farm operator households.  In the 2001 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) producers were asked whether they had developed a 
succession plan along with selected other questions that focused on business management and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 We acknowledge that other forms of transfer, such brother to bother, bother to sister, may occur; we are primarily 
interested in the classical case (father-to-son) of intergenerational transfers.  
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planning to control costs. Specifically, farmers were asked if they had a succession plan for their 
operation, whether a specific person had been identified as the successor, and whether they 
planned to exit farming for any reason other than retirement within a five year time frame. 
Responses to these questions were used to develop four mutually exclusive alternatives (M) 
regarding succession.  The first alternative (I0) describes a strategy where no succession plan is 
formed by the farm household.  The second (I1) and third (I2) alternatives describe strategies 
where succession plans are formed and they entail the designation of either a family member or a 
non-family member as the successor, respectively.  The fourth alternative (I3) describes a 
strategy by the farm household of farm exit. Let Yj take the value 1 if the jth household chooses 
the qth succession plan; 0 otherwise.  The relative odds (P) of farm succession choices are 
expressed using the following MNL model: 
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where log is the natural logarithm, X is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables, qM   is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated, and  is a random disturbance term.   
 
The conditional probability for the succession choice q is estimated as in the following: 
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which, alternatively, can be written as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The alternative is the parent generations can sell the farm and find a place for retirement and the child or children 
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In the context of this paper,  qM  in equation (2) measures the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the logarithm of the odds of a farm household choosing succession strategy I1 
relative to I0, choosing I2 relative to I0, and choosing I3 relative to I0.  The interpretation of qM   is 
simplified even further by computing the marginal effects of Xj on the probabilities of being in I1, 
I2, or I3 as in [for more detail, see Greene (1997)]: 
(5)




























                                              
 
where is a vector whose elements are the averages of all estimated ). 3 2 1 ( , , q q    The signs of 
any particular q  and  q  need not be the same.  Although by definition 0 0   , which is done for 
the purpose of facilitating the computation, the marginal effects of the attributes on the 
probability of a farm household choosing succession strategy I0 are themselves not zero, and in 
fact they are computed as  . 0 0   P    
 
Data 
Data for the analysis are from the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).  
ARMS is conducted annually by the Economic Research Service and the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service. The survey collects data to measure the financial condition (farm income,   10
expenses, assets, and debts) and operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of 
producing agricultural commodities, and the well-being of farm operator households.  
 
The 2001 ARMS collected information on farm households in addition to farm economic data 
collected through the regular survey. It also collected detailed information on off-farm hours 
worked by spouses and farm operators, the amount of income received from off-farm work, net 
cash income from operating another farm/ranch, net cash income from operating another 
business, and net income from share renting. Furthermore, income received from other sources, 
such as disability, social security, and unemployment payments, and gross income from interest 
and dividends was also counted. Specifically, our analysis will focus on married farm couples. 
The issue of retirement and succession is central to the family decision-making process and the 
literature points to the fact that a large share of farms are passed on directly to children of farm 
operators and owners. Secondly, the altruistic motive of the parent (farm family in this case) 
forms a basis for the theory of intergenerational transfers.  
 
In the 2001 ARMS, farmers were asked using a sequential type of questioning about whether 
they had developed a succession plan for their farming operation. The issue of retirement and 
succession is especially pertinent for farmers who have a short-term planning horizon, for 
example those who plan to retire in the next five years. Using the 2001 ARMS we classified farm 
operators, based on succession plans, into four alternatives: no succession plan (base group), 
family succession, non-family succession, and farm exit.  
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Nationally, a small percentage, 27 percent, of farm operators indicated that they had a succession 
plan (Figure 1). Of those, 87 percent reported that they had identified a successor, and in most 
cases the successor was a family member. When asked if the successor worked or participated in 
the farm business, 52 percent indicated that that was the case. Further, 38 percent of designated 
successors were participating in management activities and decisions for the farm (Figure 2).  
 
About 34 percent of farm operators who indicated that they would retire in the next 5 years had a 
succession plan and about 80 percent of these households had a family member taking over the 
farm. Thirty-six percent of operators who planned to exit farming to pursue off-farm work or 
business opportunities had a succession plan and almost in all cases (93 percent) the successor 
was a member of the family. Identified successors for this group of operators were also more 
likely to be working in the business and making management decisions for the farm (73 percent). 
Farm operators who were above 65 years of age and had no retirement plans appeared to be more 
organized in terms of having a succession plan than other groups of households, with about 40 
percent of these households having succession plans. As with other groups, most of the 
successors were family members. But, while a large share of these farms reported a succession 
plan, a smaller share of these actually involved their successor in operation of the business than 
did farmers in general (Figure 2). All of the variables used and summary statistics are presented 
in Table 1.  
 
Results 
The results of the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 2, and the corresponding 
marginal effects are presented in Table 3. Table 2 provides information on the overall fit of the   12
model. Since an R
2 does not accurately measure the fit of a multinomial logit model, a pseudo- 
R
2, the likelihood ratio, is calculated. The likelihood ratio is 940 representing a relatively good fit 
for a multinomial logit model (Hensher and Johnson). In our model the base group is farmers 
with no succession plan. It is our interest to investigate the factors that affect succession, both 
family and non-family, and farm exits compared to farms with no succession plan. Therefore, as 
in any case of multinomial logit models, the number of significant variables and the level of 
significance can be influenced by the base group. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients 
is awkward because they describe the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the 
logarithm of the odds of being in one of the succession groups (family and non-family) or the 
exit group relative to no succession group.  
 
Results show that the set of significant explanatory variables varies across succession models. 
The probability of having a succession plan is significantly influenced by operator’s education, 
household net worth, long term farm debt, and farm type. Literature (Tweeten; Goddard et al.) 
provides evidence that operator’s education level is an important factor that determines structural 
change in the farm sector. The probability of having a succession plan that includes a family 
member increases with the educational level of the farm operator. The coefficient of OPEDUC 
(operator’s level of education) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance (Table 2). The findings may reflect the notion that parents with a higher level of 
educational attainment may focus more intensely on the organizational and business plans for 
their business, including developing a plan for succession. Also, education levels tend to be 
positively correlated with lifetime accumulation of wealth. The correlation between educational 
level of farm operators and their spouses and off-farm work has been reported by various studies   13
in the literature. Results in Table 3 suggest that an additional year of schooling increases the 
probability of family succession by 0.012. Figure 3 reports the probabilities of farm successions 
and exits for a hypothetical farm household depending on the educational level of the farm 
operator
3.  Our results are consistent with the findings of Kimhi and Nachlieli and Stiglbauer and 
Weiss. Age is another factor that is closely related to succession. Older farm operators are more 
aware of the need for smooth transfer of the farm. Figure 4 reports the probabilities of farm 
succession (family and non-family) and farm exits for a hypothetical farm household. According 
to figure 4, family succession increases with the operator’s age. The coefficient on OPAGE 
(operator’s age) is positive for family succession and negative for non-family succession. 
However, the coefficients are not significant.  
 
Farm households are unique in the ways they accumulate wealth (Mishra et al.). Farm 
households have land, buildings and other facilities, machinery, and other equipment that are part 
of farm net worth. On the other hand, farm households accumulate nonfarm wealth (such as 
savings, investments, and real estate property) that adds to the net worth of the household 
(Mishra et al.) . As described earlier in the paper intergenerational transfer of wealth has been an 
important aspect of farm succession. Mishra et al. indicate that at least 70 percent of farm 
household wealth comes from the farm and is directly related to farm size. In this study 
household net worth is a measure of size (farm) and the financial well-being of the farm family. 
The coefficient of HHNW (household net worth) is positive and statistically different from zero 
in family and non-family succession models.  The notion is further reinforced by using a dummy 
variable, (SIZE_250), as an indicator of farm size. However, this variable was only significant in 
                                                 
3 Actual percentages for no succession, family succession, non-family succession, and farm exits are not reported 
because of space, but are available from the authors.    14
the non-family succession model. Results show that farms with sales of more than $250,000 
were more likely to have a non-family successor when compared to farms with no succession 
plans.  The probability of non-family succession increases by 0.03 when farm sales are greater 
than $250,000.  
 
There is no standard model of how farm households earn a livelihood. Instead, farm households 
use a wide variety of livelihood decisions to generate income to support choices with regard to 
consumption, saving, and investment. The Census of Agriculture has, for several decades, 
documented the trend toward off-farm work by farm operators, showing that three of ten 
operators worked off farm by the 1930's and that over half of operators had moved into non-farm 
labor markets by the 1960's. Not only has the share of operators working off farm grown but the 
amount of time, as measured in days worked off farm, has increased as well. Operators and 
spouses make decisions about whether one, both or neither work off-farm, and whether to hire 
someone to work or manage the farm operation. If the marginal value of time from off-farm 
work exceeds the marginal value of time from on-farm work or leisure, farm operators and 
spouses may find off-farm jobs more rewarding. These households may choose to live in rural 
areas and operate a business that qualifies as a farm. Many may have come into farming after 
beginning their off-farm job. Others may have moved from farming to off-farm work. These 
households might be expected to have a weaker tie to their farm than households who are 
engaged in farming as their primary source of income. A dummy variable that indicates off-farm 
work status of the farm family was included in the regression. The coefficient of OPSPOFF (both 
operator and spouses working off the farm) is positive and statistically significant at a 10 percent   15
level of significance (table 2). Results indicate that the probability of non-family succession 
increases by 0.035 if both farm operator and spouse reported working off the farm (Table 3).  
 
While studying the effect of growth rates and firm exit rates Griliches and Regev found that a 
“doomed firm” will have lower growth rates several years earlier. Grichiles and Regev call this 
the “shadow of death effect”. Kimhi et al. used a similar argument to point out that a farmer 
might be motivated to invest and raise current farm size if farm succession is known. In our 
study we used (ACRES_01) as a dummy variable that captures farm growth between 1996 and 
2001
4. Specifically, farmers were asked if they operated more, the same, or less acreage in 2001 
than they did in 1996. ACRES_01 takes a value 1 if the farm operated more acres in 2001 than in 
1996. Contrary to the “shadow of death effect” this study finds a negative relationship between 
farm growth rate and succession. The coefficient of ACRES_01 is negative and statistically 
significant at 10 percent only in the case of farm exits (Table 2). Results indicate that an increase 
in farm size reduces the probability of farm exits. This is consistent with the fact that once the 
operator has decided to increase the size of operation it is very unlikely he will exit farming or 
plan for a successor in the immediate future. These farm operators could be efficient farmers, 
with many years of farming experience, and may be earning higher returns from farming. They 
could also be farmers in the establishment and growth phases of the business and family life 
cycles.  Farm debt could also have potential impact on succession decisions. The 2001 ARMS 
survey asked farm operators about their farm debt. In particular, they were asked if farm debt in 
2001 was greater, less, or same as in 1996. A dummy variable, FDEBT_01, was created and 
coded as 1 if debt levels were greater in 2001 than in 1996. The coefficient of FDEBT_01 was 
                                                 
4 The 2001 ARMS survey asked farmers to indicate whether their operated acres in 2001 were more, less, or  the 
same as in 1996.    16
positive and significant for the family succession model (Table 2). Results indicate that the 
probability of succession (family) increases, by 0.045, with size of farm debt.  A possible 
explanation is that larger farms generally have higher amounts of farm debt and these are the 
farms that are more likely to have a successor. Further, higher farm debt loads between 1996 and 
2001 could be an indicator that farmers were willing to take more risk and finance investments 
on the farm. Taking on debt may also be an indication that upkeep, maintenance, expansion, or 
retooling of the farm’s capital structure is likely needed to keep the business a competitive 
enterprise for future generations.  
 
Farm attributes affect the succession process to the extent that both the retiree and successor  
might share farm income and labor. One of the farm attributes that is of interest in this study is 
whether succession may differ among types of farm businesses.  Pesquin et al. point out that a 
successor is more common on dairy farms since work can be divided easily between two people. 
Additionally, dairy farms (and others such as nursery, green house, etc.) may have more stable 
and reliable sources of income. Further, the successor and the operator may specialize in 
different operations of the farm. For example, recent data show that many farms, particularly 
larger operations, may have two or three people who participate in machinery work, production, 
accounting and budget, and management of the farm. Hence, we included dummy variables for 
farms that are engaged in cash grains (CASHGRAIN), other crops (such as cotton, tobacco, and 
field crops), (OTHERGCROPS), dairy (DAIRY), and beef and hogs operations (BEEF_HOGS). 
Results show the probability of family succession increases if farms are specialized in the 
production of other crops, dairy, and beef and hogs. One thing that stands out here is that each of 
these commodities (crops, dairy, and hog) are farm specializations that produce high value   17
outputs and require large capital investments. The probability of having developed a succession 
plan is highest for dairy farms (0.133), followed by other crops farms (0.072), and beef and hog 
farms (0.071).  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Succession planning is a part of the development of a complete business plan for a farm 
operation. Succession plans specify when, how, and under what circumstances management of 
the business will pass from the current operator to another individual. In one sense, succession 
plans are a road map for use in deciding how to handle management of the business as 
households enter the retirement or transfer stage of family life or incur an unexpected 
circumstance such as the incapacitation or death of the operator. Succession and retirement are 
inter-linked and are reflective of the life cycles of the farm household and the farm business. 
Growth, consolidation, and exit phases of a business may overlap with the retirement and 
transfer phases of a household. Despite the important role that succession (family and non-
family) may play in the continuity of farm businesses, little theoretical or empirical work has 
been devoted to this issue. In this paper we examine farm and family characteristics that affect 
the likelihood of a household having developed a succession plan for its farm business. Two 
types of succession are considered: (1) “family succession” and (2) “non-family succession” 
(where the farm moves outside the household). In addition, farm exits are also considered as an 
additional category. A multinomial logit model, along with 2001 ARMS farm level data, is used 
to identify factors that are important in succession decisions of farm operator households. 
   18
Nationally, just over one-fourth of farmers have developed a plan for succession or the future 
management of their business. Nearly nine out of ten farmers with a succession plan have a 
known successor identified. For this group of operators that planned goal for the business is to 
keep it in operation under known management. Since the business will continue in operation 
with management turned over to new managers, who are most often identified as family 
members, some consideration has likely been given to the ability of the farm to generate enough 
income to support the later life income needs of the operator’s household along with needs of the 
household(s) of the new management team. 
 
Factors found to significantly influence having a known successor who is a member of the 
operator’s family included education, household net worth, taking on higher debt loads in the 
past five years, and being engaged in farm businesses like dairying that require relatively large 
amounts of capital expenditures and managerial oversight. The likelihood of having a succession 
plan rises with household net worth, indicating that larger businesses may be better positioned to 
support multiple households. Operators with smaller businesses and household net worth may 
depend on their farm assets to support income needs in later life. This could likely mean leasing, 
selling, or making other use of farmland or other business assets. 
 
Having a non-family successor was also found to be significantly affected by household net 
worth and by two other factors that differed from family succession planning. These were 
operator and spouse off-farm work and operation of a farm with over $250,000 in sales. These 
operators may have come to operate a farm from an off-farm occupation or found their off-farm 
employment to provide greater return. The likelihood of these households having a non-family   19
successor may result from family members not being interested in the farm or from the operator 
treating the farm as a part of a larger investment portfolio.   20
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Table 1—Definition and weighted means of variables used in the succession and exit plans model, 2001 
  Weighted means
1 







Farm exit   All ARMS 
sample 
Age of operator (OPAGE)   
Gender of operator, dummy variable (=1 if male; 0 else) ( OPGENDER)  
Education of operator, years (OPEDUC) 
Presence of young persons, dummy variables: 
  (=1 if person’s age was under 6; 0 else) (CHILD6) 
  (=1 if person’s was between 13 and 18; 0 else) (CHILD13_18) 
Off-farm labor participation, dummy variables: 
  (=1 if only the operator worked off-farm; 0 else) (OPOFFONLY) 
  (=1 if only the spouse worked off-farm; 0 else) (SPOFFONLY) 
  (=1 if both operator and spouse worked off-farm; 0 else) OPSPOFF) 
Household net worth ($10,000) (HHNW) 
Farm organization, dummy variable:  
  (=1 if sole proprietorship; 0 else) (SOLE) 
Farm size, dummy variables: 
  (=1 if sales were between $100,000 and $249,999; 0 else) (SIZE100_250) 
  (=1 if sales were $250,000 or more; 0 else) (SIZE_250) 
Productivity index (0=least productive, 100=most productive) (PRODINDEX) 
Farm tenure, dummy variable (=1 if farm was fully owned; 0 else) (FULLOWN) 
Past indebtedness dummy variable: 
  (=1 if farm debt in 2001 was more than in 1996; 0 else) (FDEBT_01) 
Income stream, dummy variable:  
  (=1 if household income in 2001 was below 1996’s income  (INCOME_01) 
Farm growth, dummy variable: 
  (=1 if household operated more acres in 2001 than in 1996; 0 else) (ACRES_01) 
Expected government support, dummy variable: 
  (=1 if support was expected regardless of prices over next 4 years; 0 else) (GOVP)  
Type of farm specialization, dummy variables: 
 (1= if farm specialized in cash grain production; 0 else) (CASHGRAIN) 
 (1= if farm specialized in production of other crops; 0 else) (OTHERCROPS) 
 (1= if farm specialized in dairy production; 0 else) (DAIRY) 
 (1= if farm specialized in production of beef, cattle, or hogs; 0 else) (BEEF_HOGS) 
Regional dummy variables: 
 (=1, if location = non-metro farming county; 0 else) (NONMETROF)  
 (=1, if location = metro county; 0 else) (METRO)  
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1 The coefficients of variation (CVs) of all non-binary estimates are below 15 percent.  Differences in the means of non-binary estimates in the second 
(2
nd), third (3
rd), and fourth (4
th) succession categories and those in the first (1
st) category (i.e., ‘No succession’ are examined with * indicating that the 
respective means (in 2
nd, 3
rd, and 4
th) within each row are statistically different (at 10% level or better) from the means in the 1
st category.    25
Table 2--Multinomial logit estimates of factors affecting succession and exit plans by farm 
households, 2001  










































Number of observation: 
  Sample: 4,608 
  Population: 1,693,159  
 
Log Likelihood:  
  -1,362,002 
  Restricted Log Likelihood: 
  -1,453,337 





















   0.4229* 
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   0.0013* 
-0.2996 
 0.3097 









































Note: Regression parameters are estimated using the Jackknife variance estimation method.
 * Significant 
at 10%.  
** Significant at 5%.  
*** Significant at 1%.  
1 P0, P1, P2, and P3 are the probabilities of the household having no succession plan, of having family 
succession plan, of having non-family succession plan, and of having a plan of farm exit, respectively 
(see equations (x) and (x)).    26
Table3--Predicted marginal effects (averaged over individuals) of factors affecting the 
probabilities of farm succession and farm exit, 2001
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1 The computation of the marginal effects is done based on equation (x). 
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Figure 2: Participation of successor in farm work, management activities, 
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Figure 3—Farm operator’s education and the expected probabilities of farm succession 
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